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ABSTRACT
Articial intelligence shows promise for solving many practical
societal problems in areas such as healthcare and transportation.
However, the current mechanisms for AI model diusion such as
Github code repositories, academic project webpages, and commer-
cial AI marketplaces have some limitations; for example, a lack of
monetization methods, model traceability, and model auditabilty. In
this work, we sketch guidelines for a new AI diusion method based
on a decentralized online marketplace. We consider the technical,
economic, and regulatory aspects of such a marketplace including
a discussion of solutions for problems in these areas. Finally, we
include a comparative analysis of several current AI marketplaces
that are already available or in development. We nd that most of
these marketplaces are centralized commercial marketplaces with
relatively few models.
1 INTRODUCTION
Articial intelligence (AI) is predicted to have a major societal
impact over the coming decades. Specically, when widely diused,
AI models have the potential to solve many ubiquitous problems in
domains ranging from healthcare to transportation. For example,
neural network based models have shown human and super-human
level performance in many health related diagnostic tasks such as
breast cancer detection [1].
However, to achieve widespread diusion of AI models and thus
capture these benets, an ecient diusion mechanism is required.
Unfortunately, many popular diusion mechanisms such as col-
lections of Github repositories, academic research project pages,
and existing commercial AI marketplaces have major limitations.
Github repositories and academic research projects generally do
not have straightforward monetization methods and installing, con-
guring, applying, and supporting models from these sources can
be cumbersome (as such concerns are usually not paramount to
academic researchers). While existing commercial AI marketplaces
(refer to Section 7) are oen centralized and controlled by a single
company that may have dierent motives from the majority of
the marketplace users thus allowing for conict and a single point
of failure. Additionally, the models available on commercial AI
marketplaces may lag behind the state-of-the-art models available
on Github or project pages. Finally, the datasets for training such
AI models oen cannot be provided for privacy or other reasons,
thus the traceability and auditability of models from these sources
is lacking. Traits such as these will be important given new AI reg-
ulations currently in development by, for example, the European
Union (refer to Section 6).
Given the limitations of existing mechanisms, in this paper we
aim to sketch guidelines for a new AI diusion mechanism based
on a decentralized online marketplace and hereaer known as AI
marketplace. We consider the technical, economic, and regula-
tory aspects of creating such a marketplace in order to reach the
goal of broad yet ethical AI diusion (as shown in Figure 1). e
AI marketplace we propose would bring together various actors,
including developers and companies of dierent sizes, users, data
collectors, and even governmental entities, towards this common
goal.
2 WHAT IS AI MARKETPLACE?
In our vision, the AI marketplace should facilitate two high level
operations: 1) a developer should be able to sell their pre-trained
AI models in the marketplace, and 2) a customer should be able
to request a custom AI model which suits their specic needs,
and the marketplace should be able to match such customers with
developers who could build such a model. Also the marketplace
should facilitate, when necessary, data sharing (selling and buying)
and participation of marketplace actors in, for example, federated
learning in support of the mentioned operations.
In a high-level sense, an AI marketplace is similar to other on-
line marketplaces like eBay in terms of business operations and
dynamics (e.g., two-sided network eects). However, at the same
time, such a marketplace diers from those markets because of the
nature of the products. Specically, an AI marketplace is dierent
from a conventional online marketplace in the following ways:
• Developing AI models oen requires the sharing of data
from the customer side, and such data may be proprietary.
erefore, an AI marketplace may have a mechanism which
ensures that developers use that data only for training
purposes.
• An AI marketplace needs a mechanism which can deter-
mine the quality of a nal delivered AI model. Conven-
tionally, accuracy has been the primary metric. However,
alternative metrics that capture reliability, robustness, and
fairness are also now considered important.
• Like in any conventional soware system, AI systems also
require maintenance over time. In the standard soware
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industry, the company which originally developed the so-
ware is usually responsible for providing support. How-
ever, in an AI marketplace, specic AI developers may not
be available in the future. So, an AI marketplace needs
standard guidelines which AI developers should follow
while developing models for marketplace customers. us
maintenance by other AI developers is much easier.
An AI marketplace could also be considered similar to a mobile
app store like Google Playstore and Apple App Store. ese stores
host many AI-enabled applications, however, they still dier from
an AI marketplace in some signicant ways:
• Unlike in an app store, an AI marketplace could allow
customers to request new products on the y. An AI mar-
ketplace can then quickly match AI customers with AI
developers with relevant expertise.
• Some AI models are proprietary. So, unlike in an app store,
they can not be shared online with a wider audience, as
this would further facilitate adversarial aacks and risk
leaking intellectual property.
Finally, an AI marketplace is also similar to an online data mar-
ketplace. For example, in both marketplaces the products sold could
leak private user data. Specically, aacks against AI models like
model inversion [12][46] and membership inference [35][40] can
extract information about users whose data was used in training.
However, data marketplaces can still be considered closer to con-
ventional online marketplaces, rather than AI marketplaces, since
the transferring of data can be considered analogous to the trans-
ferring of physical products (assuming that privacy regulations
have been followed) as aer the transfer (or successful trade) lile
maintenance is needed, unlike for AI models.
3 DRIVING FORCES BEHIND AI
MARKETPLACE
An AI Marketplace aims to respond to several issues within the
current AI community. Specically, in order for AI to diuse and
achieve widespread adoption, it is necessary to address the follow-
ing concerns:
Lack of interoperability standards: Currently, there are mul-
tiple frameworks for developing diverse AI models. Dierent de-
velopers use dierent frameworks (TensorFlow, PyTorch, Cae2),
dierent languages (Python, Java, C/C++), and target dierent en-
vironments (powerful Linux server, smartphone, minimalist IoT
device) depending on the intended usage. Each of these elements
comes with challenges. A small AI company may want to pipeline
a server-based PyTorch AI model with an externally developed
smartphone-based TensorFlow AI model. However, the current
lack of interoperability standards dramatically limits such opportu-
nities, and adapting existing models is a tedious task (potentially
including redeveloping an application-specic AI model) [13][25].
Lack of infrastructure for AI data cooperation: Many state-
of-the-art AI models, especially those based on deep learning, re-
quire very large datasets. Unfortunately, the creation, management,
and sharing of very large datasets is oen dicult for many AI
developers (due to resource or capability limitations). As a result,
AI development with large data is dominated by researchers in
large organizations that have signicant capabilities and resources.
Rise of data protection regulations: Collecting user’s data is
increasingly dicult due to privacy regulations around the world,
such as the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
or the California Consumer Privacy Act. ese regulations put
the burden of protecting the user’s privacy on the shoulders of
data collectors. Users may give consent to collect their personal
data at a given point in time, but they can also withdraw their
consent later. e data collector is then oen required to erase the
collected data. Furthermore, fullling these requests requires both
technical expertise and regulatory expertise. Most AI developers
do not possess both of these skills [33].
Large cost of AI development and operation: According to
a Teradata survey, the lack of IT infrastructure (40%) and the lack
of talent (34%) are the two most signicant barriers to AI realiza-
tion [43]. e current lack of qualied AI professionals makes it
expensive to hire an AI team. A fully-edged AI team not only
consists of AI developers, but also domain experts, data engineers,
product designers, AI sociologists, and IT lawyers. Most small
businesses can not aord to hire such an expensive team [51]. Ad-
ditionally, as mentioned, the infrastructure to collect and store the
massive amounts of data required for model development, training,
and operation is also costly.
An AI marketplace is a potential solution for overcoming many of
these barriers. An AI marketplace can make AI models and datasets
accessible to end-users and developers, and give developers a way
to monetize their models.
4 TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF AI
MARKETPLACE
In a basic AI marketplace seing, an AI customer may arrive with a
training dataset, and another smaller dataset referred to as a “vali-
dation” dataset, and want to build a prediction model that performs
well on this validation dataset. e AI marketplace can match the
customer with AI developers with the skills needed to build a model.
If the model developed by the AI developer based on the training
dataset (provided by the customer) achieves suciently high ac-
curacy (or other metric(s) with a threshold set by the customer)
on the validation dataset, then customer and developer can move
forward with the transaction.
However, the potential AI model (e.g., a deep neural network
like ResNet or Inception) may require a large amount of training
data which the customer may not have. Furthermore, the original
training dataset provided by the customer may itself be from multi-
ple private sources (e.g., mobile crowdsensing, shopping paerns)
and may follow some multimodal distribution. e AI marketplace
should also be able to help the customer by allowing the aggregation
of multiple alternative datasets from the marketplace while also
ensuring the aggregate dataset follows a similar distribution (e.g.,
using a transfer learning approach [50]) as the validation dataset.
is is important since AI learning algorithms suer from major
model quality loss (or even divergence) when trained on non-IID
data [19]. In the process, the marketplace should also enable the
monetization of data in a trusted, fair manner while preserving
data ownership and privacy as much as possible [29].
Let us consider the following scenario in the healthcare domain.
e consumer is a newly established cancer treatment hospital, and
2
the data sources are cancer institutions from dierent geographical
locations across the globe. e goal of the new hospital is to con-
struct an ML model that can predict the early onset of a given form
of cancer. e model must perform well given the demography
of its patients, and therefore it is crucial to collect data similar to
the small validation set that is representative of the demography.
However, the individual data sources have widely dierent demo-
graphics data due to their locations. e goal of an AI Marketplace
in such a seing is to enable the collection of a dataset sampled
from these sources that matches the demography of the new hos-
pital and in the process aributes fair value to the dierent data
sources. In other seings, the data owner or consumer may not
have sucient AI expertise or skills. e marketplace should be
able to connect the consumer to AI experts, and at the same time,
should provide a platform for AI experts to assess the performance
of their models on the consumer’s validation dataset without direct
access to the dataset (by the AI experts).
A model/data exchange mechanism in an AI marketplace should
have the following properties:
• All individual data sources and the consumer should have
privacy protection in the form of dierential privacy guar-
antees to communicate with a specic actor (data owner,
AI expert, customer). Such dierential privacy guarantees
can be achieved by ensuring that all data transferred (be-
tween the aggregator and various data owners) is entirely
anonymized, de-identied, and ideally encrypted.
• Transfer learning should be facilitated in the sense that
the aggregating entity acquires a summary training dataset
that is statistically related to the consumer validation dataset
with respect to the requested metrics.
• e aggregator can only learn the pairwise Euclidean dis-
tances between the points in the training dataset.
• Consumers having sucient AI skills, but no or lile train-
ing data should be able to leverage federated learning on
the marketplace to facilitate learning without moving raw
training data from its original owners. However, to fa-
cilitate quick convergence, the marketplace should locate
data sources which are nearly identical and independently
distributed.
• All entities, i.e., AI model contributor or data contributor,
should be awarded fairly for their contribution. Unlike
normal goods in online marketplaces like eBay, deciding
the fair award (or data/model price) is non-trivial in an AI
marketplace.
• No collaborating entities, i.e., data provider or model train-
ing provider in case of federated learning, should be able
to cheat in the model building process. In other words,
the marketplace should provide robustness against data
providers or training update providers who commit mali-
cious or low quality contributions. us the marketplace
should incorporate a verication mechanism which will
assess the quality of the contribution, and hence will de-
termine rewards accordingly.
In addition to the properties mentioned above, AI marketplace
should also incorporate other relevant properties from conventional
marketplaces, e.g., ensuring liquidity in the market [48], providing a
framework for conict resolution between consumer and seller [44].
In the remainder of this section, we discuss potential solutions to
address these properties.
4.1 Maintaining data privacy in AI marketplace
In an AI marketplace context, two major strategies can ensure data
privacy for the involved actors.
Federated learning/Peer-to-Peer (P2P) learning as learn-
ing paradigms: Under the federated learning framework [21][17]
or the P2P learning framework [3][8], raw data never leaves the
owners’ devices, and thus data privacy and ownership of the origi-
nal raw data is always ensured with data owners. However, such
paradigms add computational overload in the form of local training
on the data owner’s end.
Using contextual integrity as designprinciple for data shar-
ing: e idea of privacy trading is also gaining popularity [4][20].
Many users who are less privacy-sensitive may be willing to sell
their privacy. However, even such users should know the future
use of their raw data before selling it. e principle of contextual in-
tegrity allows enforcing data privacy by providing a framework for
evaluating the ow of personal information between dierent recip-
ients and explaining why certain paerns of information ow are
acceptable in one context but problematic in another [36][54]. e
contextual integrity framework allows users to maintain control of
their data even aer trading it.
4.2 Price determination in AI marketplace
Ensuring that the marketplace is transparent in assigning value
based on the quality of the data or model relative to the target is
extremely important. Unlike in conventional online marketplaces,
deciding the right price of data or an AI model is non-trivial. In
conventional online marketplaces, the price in the oine market
can serve as a reference. Also, in a corporate AI seing, experts can
estimate the resources required for a project and hence negotiate
the price of AI models with potential buyers. However, in an online
AI marketplace, an individual AI developer may not possess the
skills to determine the right price for their model.
To ensure fairness when deriving the price, the marketplace
should provide a bidding mechanism. is bidding mechanism
should ideally 1) be a dominant strategy and incentives-compatible.
e dominant strategy of each entity is to bid the amount equal to
their private valuation. Bidding this true valuation always leads to
a non-zero utility for any entities, 2) maximize the social surplus
when all entities report their valuations truthfully, and 3) be imple-
mentable in polynomial (preferably linear) time in order to enable
scalability. Any mechanism satisfying these three conditions can
be said to have employed Vickrey auction [47].
Another approach could be to organize contests among AI de-
velopers for some pre-dened reward. However, contests and their
corresponding reward incentives should be designed based on ac-
curate models of AI developers’ strategic behaviour to elicit the
desired outcomes [14]. Depending on the strategic behaviour of
the AI developers, dierent kinds of contests can be organized, e.g.,
contests which reward a xed number of AI developers, contests
which take the form of a tournament, or contests which award
everything to the winner [9][15].
3
4.3 Robustness against malicious entities in AI
marketplace
A Federated learning or P2P learning framework ensures data pri-
vacy and ownership of the data to the original owners. However,
such a framework also introduces a number of vulnerabilities. Some
entities may want to free-ride by trying to capture benets (or pay-
ments) without making honest contributions, e.g., sending random
training updates to the server instead of updates calculated on
real data aer local training. In other scenarios, other competi-
tors/adversaries may try to introduce model poisoning in order to
reduce the reputation of the given marketplace. An AI marketplace
should have a verication mechanism to assess whether the given
data or training updates are coming from free-riders [27], malicious
entities [5], or honest users.
4.4 Auditability in AI marketplace
e entire process must be transparent and immutable in order
to ensure trust and fairness. Based on how this process is en-
forced in the marketplace, there exists two types of marketplaces:
1) centralized marketplaces, where a trusted entity ensures smooth
operations and maintains an immutable log of all operations on the
platform, and 2) decentralized marketplaces, where no single entity
is solely trusted by one entity. Instead, all operations are stored
on an immutable public distributed ledger (or a public Blockchain).
Both marketplace types have their pros and cons. In a centralized
marketplace, since the central managing entity earns revenue by
charging a small transaction fee for each successful transaction, the
entity is motivated to maintain smooth operations on the market-
place by verifying the identity of all parties, improving matching
mechanisms, supporting buyer-seller conict resolution, and en-
suring liquidity in the market. In a decentralized AI marketplace,
all these goals can be achieved, at the expense of higher energy
and time consumption since any changes in the policy must have
consensus from peers on the marketplace. Current consensus al-
gorithms are energy-intensive [2], but these are likely to improve
in the future. A decentralized AI marketplace is a true enabler of
the vision of democratization of the current tightly concentrated
AI ecosystem among a limited number of large players.
5 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF AI
MARKETPLACE
Online marketplaces represent an interesting business model in
that they facilitate transactions between suppliers and customers
oen without taking possession of or full responsibility for prod-
ucts or services; thus they have very low cost structures and very
high gross margins (e.g., 70% for eBay, 60% for Etsy). Addition-
ally, network eects make them highly defensible. For example,
Alibaba, Craigslist, eBay, and Rakuten are more than 15 years old,
but still dominate their sectors. In the past ten years, the number
of online marketplaces worth more than $1 billion has gone from
two (Craigslist and eBay) to more than a dozen in the United States
(Airbnb, Etsy, Groupon, GrubHub Seamless, Lending Club, Ly,
Prosper, umbtack, Uber, and Upwork). at number is expected
to double by the end of 2020, according to Greylock Partners, a
Silicon Valley venture capital rm [16].
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Figure 1: Aspects of an AI Marketplace
In order to build a successful AI marketplace, a critical number of
buyers and suppliers of AI models are needed, just like in any other
online marketplace. Potential suppliers for such a marketplace
could be AI developers of algorithms and soware on platforms
like Github, whereas potential buyers could be companies that can
not aord their own team of AI experts.
5.1 Network eects
A network eect is a phenomenon whereby the value of a plat-
form or service (to an individual participant) is proportional to the
number of participants. is phenomenon is oen the single-most
important factor behind the success or failure of any online plat-
form. Platforms like eBay and Facebook continue to dominate their
respective markets partly because they exploit these network eects
very well, whereas platforms like Google Plus did not take o partly
due to being on the wrong end of such network eects [53][23].
So, network eects would be a crucial element for the success or
failure of an AI marketplace as well.
e current AI ecosystem favors major players like Google and
Facebook as they are already exploiting so called data network
eects very well. Specically, AI-based products or services from
these companies become smarter as they train on more data from
more users [34][26]. In tur , smarter products nd services aract
more new users, thus creating a feedback loop.
With the adoption of two-tier model training architecture like
federated learning [17] (e.g., the rst tier being a general global
model and the second tier being a personalized local model), chal-
lenging the dominance of these companies will be even more dif-
cult. Specically, this architecture allows these large companies
to provide personalized model training to AI customers. e com-
panies provide a pre-trained general model (trained on datasets
either owned by the company or procured by the company), and
the AI customer personalizes by training on their local dataset. is
training paradigm works well even with smaller amounts of a user’s
training data.
So, if an AI marketplace wishes to challenge the dominance
of these companies, it needs to support interoperability between
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datasets and models so that smaller developers can eciently ag-
gregate enough smaller training datasets, federated training users,
or even models (into an ensemble) to compete (or at least reach a
minimum threshold) in terms of performance.
5.2 Disintermediation
Conventional online marketplaces fear that once they facilitate a
successful transaction, the buyer and the seller will agree to conduct
their subsequent interactions outside the marketplace. However,
such a risk could be minimized for an AI marketplace. Speci-
cally, many AI models tend to be black box in nature and an AI
marketplace could oer buyers independent assessments of the AI
model which they are about to procure (thus providing an added-
value service). Such assessments might even be mandated by future
government regulations as discussed in section 6.
Other strategies could also incentivize AI customers to deal with
AI developers through the marketplace. For example, an AI market-
place could also ensure the prices for products without added value
(like the mentioned assessments) are the same as when consumers
buy directly from the seller or via other channels, otherwise this
may also lead to a disintermediation problem.
5.3 Information asymmetry
In terms of matching AI customers with AI developers, an AI mar-
ketplace is an online freelance marketplace that matches buyers
of electronically deliverable services with freelancers. Just like in
any freelancing marketplace, AI customers may also face the issue
of “information asymmetry”, i.e., they may face uncertainty over
the quality of individual AI developers. A solution to this dilemma
is a trust or reputation mechanism to help facilitate transactions
between strangers. Unlike in a conventional online marketplace
where transactions mostly involve products/services and monetary
payments, transactions in an AI marketplace may also involve train-
ing datasets, which may themselves have economic value; therefore
mechanisms of an AI marketplace should ensure an even greater
degree of trust. Luca et al. [28] found that in an online freelance
marketplace, customers are forward-looking and that they place
signicant weight on a seller’s reputation. ough, not controlling
for buyers’ inter-temporal trade-os and dynamic selection can
considerably bias such reputations. us, an AI marketplace should
not rely entirely on a reputation mechanism built on reviews from
buyers and sellers to tackle the issue of information asymmetry [52].
e marketplace needs to play an active role to ensure fairness in
these reputations mechanisms. Given that many AI models are
black box in nature, the marketplace may need to support inde-
pendent assessments of an AI model (before nal procurement) as
suggested in Section 4, reputation mechanisms could be primarily
centered around such assessments in order to ensure fairness.
6 REGULATORY ASPECTS OF AI
MARKETPLACE
e regulation of AI marketplaces, as well as the regulation of AI
in general, is still a signicant unknown with major countries only
beginning to grapple with the dicult task. e regulation of any
AI marketplace as such would combine the regulatory frameworks
from several dierent domains: regulation of the oen sensitive
training/testing data, regulation of the application of the AI model
(oen in sensitive domains), and regulation of online marketplaces.
6.1 Market and data regulation
e regulation of online marketplaces and sensitive data have histor-
ical precedents (e.g., Sherman Act and Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in the USA) due to the analogues
of oine marketplaces and physical data. ese regulations are
thus being overhauled (e.g., GDPR in Europe) to beer deal with
the issues brought by the internet and AI eras. erefore, an AI
marketplace must comply with these new regulations. As discussed,
the fundamental architecture of an AI marketplace can help ensure
compliance through data privacy mechanisms such as dierential
privacy and federated learning and prevention of marketplace mo-
nopoly through open interoperability standards (no lock-in and
low switching costs). Unfortunately, even current regulations like
GDPR are vague in many cases, thus creating uncertainty and cau-
tiousness in companies that may deter participation in an AI market.
ese uncertainties are compounded by the diering approaches
to such regulations in varying markets [39]. We discuss this topic
further in Section 6.4.
6.2 AI regulation
In terms of AI itself, the regulation is currently very sparse but devel-
oping. For example, the EU recently released a dra paper outlining
it’s vision for AI regulation in high-risk areas (e.g., transportation
or health care) [11][49], as well as ethical guidelines for building
trustworthy AI systems [18][22]. e dra includes an overarch-
ing framework that would cover the training data (including data
traceability and coverage to ensure fairness), model transparency
(to understand why certain decisions are taken), and liability (in
case of harm).
Similar to the data-centric regulations, an AI marketplace can
ensure that at least some subset of the marketplace (e.g., a high-risk
area section) enforces or checks that the AI follows these regula-
tions. For example, data traceability can be ensured (at least up to
the point of individual marketplace actors) through the use of the
public ledger to track the actors providing the data [42]. Similarly,
adequate training data coverage (to prevent discrimination or bias
by AI [37]) can be ensured through the use of diverse third party
(e.g., even government or conformity bodies) validation datasets
enforced in a smart contract. In fact, the EU already discusses in
the dra paper the potential for “support structures” and “online
tools [that] could facilitate compliance” to help especially small and
medium size businesses [11]. e marketplace could also period-
ically re-verify compliance as models evolve as such regulations
apply both ex-ante and ex-post. As a nal example, data privacy in
the visual domain could be ensured by incorporating a mandatory
privacy-respecting mechanism in vision-based applications [41].
Interestingly, in the US, for example, the healthcare domain does
have some regulations for AI/ML models partly derived from exist-
ing regulations on healthcare soware. In fact, many of the models
available on existing commercial AI marketplaces are healthcare
based (refer to Section 7). As an example of a current regulatory
problem, the US regulator is discussing how to regulate AI/ML
models that frequently or continuously learn without requiring a
5
regulatory review aer every model update (which could be the
case under current regulations) [45]. Again, such future regula-
tions could potentially leverage automated testing on independent
government or conformity body validation datasets through an AI
marketplace.
Even unconventional organizations are delving into the area,
with the Vatican organizing a workshop denoted as “e ‘Good’
Algorithm? Articial Intelligence: Ethics, Law, Health” [31]. Ad-
ditionally, AI regulation and governance has been the subject of
recent interdisciplinary academic research by computer scientists,
lawyers, and others [7][30].
6.3 Liability regulation
Liability in the case of such an AI marketplace is also a dicult
problem stemming from the diculty of liability in both AI and on-
line marketplace platforms contexts. Hereaer, given the economic
context, we focus on civil liability as opposed to criminal liability.
Firstly, civil liability, in general, must balance the need to incen-
tivize product safety and compensate victims of harm with the need
to encourage business innovation. is balance is especially di-
cult given the rapid innovation in AI and the potential economic
and societal benets of AI. Additionally, in many legal systems,
such as the EU, for compensation the victim must prove damage,
a product defect, and a causal link between the two [10]. With
complex AI or soware-based systems, identifying the liable per-
son can be burdensome or in cases with human-AI collaborative
systems the liable person may be unclear. A possible solution is to
alter the burden of proof requirement, for example, by inverting the
burden to rest with the producing company. is inversion would
require companies to have very clear and coherent tracking and
documenting of AI models which the AI marketplace inherently
enables.
In terms of online marketplaces, the liability of companies such
as Amazon for products from third-party sellers on their plat-
form (about 58% of Amazon sales) is a maer of ongoing legal
debate [24][6]. For example, in the US, the issue of liability cur-
rently revolves around whether Amazon is considered in a legal
sense “a seller” or simply “a platform for sellers and buyers”. is,
in turn, is primarily related to how much power they have over the
third party sellers (along with several other considerations). Court
cases (e.g., Oberdorf v. Amazon) are currently in progress, and a
case may eventually reach the US supreme court. Currently, the
status quo in the US is that amazon is not liable. e situation in
Europe is similar, with on-going work on developing new regula-
tions and eventually adapting the EU Product Liability Directive [6].
Given this background, under current trends, if the AI marketplace
does not exert strict control and gain excessive power over sellers,
then liability could be minimized by maintaining the status of a
platform.
6.4 Regulatory evolution
Overall, any AI marketplace would need to evolve along with novel
regulation (e.g., safety or export regulations) or risk becoming unus-
able by legitimate users. Specically, several distinct marketplaces
or strict marketplace access controls may be necessary given new
export regulations. For example, new US regulations require com-
panies to have a special license to export certain geospatial AI
soware [38]. e justication for the new regulations is based on
national security (with especially China in mind [32]). Addition-
ally, a marketplace may need to follow the strictest common safety
regulations given the potential for safety regulatory divergence
between the US, EU, China, and others. For example, with data
privacy, many global internet companies are now GDPR compliant
even if they are primarily domiciled elsewhere because they have
European interests or customers.
Unfortunately, even in the long term, regulatory convergence
may be dicult because AI is also viewed as a strategic security
and economic asset to many countries, and thus some do not want
to impede any technological progress with regulation [39].
7 WHEREWE ARE NOW?
In Table 1, we provide the list of companies which are either pro-
viding an AI marketplace or in the process of building such a mar-
ketplace. To nd such companies, we searched on Google using
the keywords: “online marketplace”, “data marketplace”, and “AI
marketplace” and extracted the rst ten pages. We then manually
visited all links from these pages and checked which describe an
entity providing for the trading of AI models, a service to enable
trading of AI models, or are in the process of building either of
these. Aer six pages, the search results no longer provided any
meaningful links. Eventually, we identied the 24 companies or
frameworks listed in Table 1.
Most of these companies are based in either the USA or Europe.
Among those which are currently available, none list more than
24 dierent models (Nauance Communications lists 24, Gravity AI
lists 12, and IBM Imaging lists ve models), thus suggesting that
none have seen major or widespread adoption. e marketplaces
which are somewhat mature primarily focus on the healthcare
domain. However, these marketplaces are not operating in multiple
countries potentially due to the need for regulatory approval of
such models in each country or economic area (for example, by the
US Food and Drug Administration).
e overarching goal of most of these AI marketplaces aligns
with our vision of a general marketplace where buyers and sellers
engage in transactions for AI models. In terms of the technical
aspects for a successful AI marketplace, from Section 4, most of the
marketplaces have not yet incorporated these though they do oen
acknowledge the need for such aspects. For example, only two of
them mention that they support scalable privacy-preserving model
training paradigms like federated learning. As for architecture,
most of the marketplaces are proprietary and are based on a cen-
tralized architecture. ough the few decentralized marketplaces
are primarily based on distributed ledgers, similar to our vision.
With regard to the pricing mechanism, most of them are using xed
pricing per model.
8 CONCLUSION
In this work, we outlined the principles for a marketplace for AI
models based on a decentralized online structure. Such a mar-
ketplace could help democratize and diuse AI technology to the
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Table 1: Existing AI marketplace frameworks and implementations
AI Marketplace Domain Focus Org Type Architecture Target Market Domicile Status
Nuance Communications Diagnostic Imaging For Prot Centralized USA & Canada USA Online
Agorai Variousa For Prot Centralized Global Singapore Online
IBM Imaging Healthcare For Prot Centralized USA USA Online
Envoy AI Medical Imaging For Prot Centralized USA USA Online
GraphGrail AI Variousb For Prot Centralized Russia Russian Online
Algorithmia General For Prot Centralized USA USA Online
Neuromation Variousd For Prot Centralized Global USA Online
Ocean Protocol General For Prot Decentralized Global Singapore Online
OVHcloud AI General For Prot Centralized Global France Beta
Orange AI General For Prot Centralized Global France Beta
Kynisys Variousc For Prot Centralized Global UK Beta
Gravity AI General For Prot Centralized Global USA Beta
SingularityNET General Non-prot Decentralized Global Netherlands Beta
Modzy General For Prot Centralized USA USA Alpha
Alphacat Fintech For Prot Centralized Global - Alpha
Bonseyes General For Prot Centralized Europe Switzerland In-development
Akira AI General For Prot Centralized Global India In-development
Genesis AI General For Prot Centralized Global USA In-development
AI Global General Non-prot Centralized Global USA In-development
Synapse AI General For Prot Decentralized Global USA In-development
TensorTask General Non-prot Decentralized Global USA In-development
Nomidman General For-prot Decentralized Global Estonia In-development
OSA Decentralized Variouse For-prot Decentralized Global BVIg In-development
DaiMoN General Non-prot Decentralized - - PoCf
a Finance, Healthcare, Retail, & Advertising
b Finance, Travel, Retail, Advertising, & Consumer Goods
c Security & IoT, Oil & Gas, Robotics, & Automobile
d Surveillance, Retail, Medical Imaging, Industrial Robotics, & Manufacturing
e Retail, Manufacturing, & Consumer Goods
f Proof of Concept (Academic Work)
g British Virgin Islands
greater society, including to smaller actors (like small and medium-
size companies). We discussed the technical, economic, and reg-
ulatory aspects to consider while designing such a marketplace.
We also described (oen novel) technologies and solutions that
can help address problems in these aspects. For example, utiliz-
ing federated learning for privacy-preserving machine learning
across marketplace actors. Finally, we studied the current state of
various AI marketplaces and provided a comparative analysis of
these marketplaces based on properties such as architecture, do-
main, and status. We found that most of these currently available
marketplaces are centralized and company-driven with relatively
few models per marketplace. us suggesting that AI marketplaces
are still in their infancy.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
is work has been supported by the 5GEAR project funded by
the Academy of Finland (Decision No. 319669) and the FIT project
funded by the Academy of Finland (Decision No. 325570).
REFERENCES
[1] Mohamed Alloghani, Dhiya Al-Jumeily, Ahmed J. Aljaaf, Mohammed Khalaf,
Jamila Mustana, and Sin Y. Tan. 2020. e Application of Articial Intelligence
Technology in Healthcare: A Systematic Review. In Applied Computing to Support
Industry: Innovation and Technology, Mohammed I. Khalaf, Dhiya Al-Jumeily,
and Alexei Lisitsa (Eds.). Springer International Publishing, 248–261.
[2] Michael Barnard. 2018. Blockchain - An Innovation Enabler for Clean Tech-
nology. Technical Report. hps://future-trends.cleantechnica.com/reports/
blockchain-innovation-enabler-clean-technology-2018/.
[3] Aure´lien Bellet, Rachid Guerraoui, Mahsa Taziki, and Marc Tommasi. 2018. Per-
sonalized and Private Peer-to-Peer Machine Learning. In International Conference
on Articial Intelligence and Statistics. 473–481.
[4] Alastair R Beresford, Andrew Rice, Nicholas Skehin, and Ripduman Sohan. 2011.
Mockdroid: trading privacy for application functionality on smartphones. In
Proceedings of the 12th workshop on mobile computing systems and applications.
49–54.
[5] Arjun Nitin Bhagoji, Supriyo Chakraborty, Prateek Mial, and Seraphin Calo.
2019. Analyzing Federated Learning through an Adversarial Lens. In International
Conference on Machine Learning. 634–643.
[6] Christoph Busch. 2019. When Product Liability Meets the Platform Economy: A
European Perspective on Oberdorf v. Amazon. Journal of European Consumer
and Market Law 8 (2019), 173–174.
[7] Corinne Cath. 2018. Governing articial intelligence: ethical, legal and technical
opportunities and challenges. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society
A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences 376, 2133 (2018), 20180080.
hps://doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2018.0080
7
[8] Hsin-Pai Cheng, Patrick Yu, Haojing Hu, Feng Yan, Shiyu Li, Hai Li, and Yiran
Chen. 2018. LEASGD: an Ecient and Privacy-Preserving Decentralized Algo-
rithm for Distributed Learning. CoRR abs/1811.11124 (2018). arXiv:1811.11124
hp://arxiv.org/abs/1811.11124
[9] David Easley and Arpita Ghosh. 2015. Behavioral mechanism design: optimal
crowdsourcing contracts and prospect theory. ACM SIGecom Exchanges 14, 1
(2015), 89–94.
[10] European Commission. 2020. Report on the safety and liabil-
ity implications of Articial Intelligence, the Internet of ings
and robotics. Technical Report. hps://ec.europa.eu/info/les/
commission-report-safety-and-liability-implications-ai-internet-things-and-robotics
en.
[11] European Commission. 2020. White Paper on Articial Intelligence A European
approach to excellence and trust. Technical Report. hps://ec.europa.eu/info/les/
white-paper-articial-intelligence-european-approach-excellence-and-trust
en.
[12] Ma Fredrikson, Somesh Jha, and omas Ristenpart. 2015. Model inversion
aacks that exploit condence information and basic countermeasures. In Pro-
ceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications
Security. 1322–1333.
[13] Ishaya GAMBO, Oluwatolani OLUWAGBEMI, and Philip ACHIMUGU. 2011.
Lack of Interoperable Health Information Systems in Developing Countries:
An Impact Analysis. Journal of Health Informatics in Developing Countries 5, 1
(2011).
[14] Arpita Ghosh and Robert Kleinberg. 2016. Optimal contest design for simple
agents. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) 4, 4 (2016),
1–41.
[15] Oliver Gu¨rtler and Mahias Kra¨kel. 2010. Optimal tournament contracts for
heterogeneous workers. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 75, 2
(2010), 180–191.
[16] Andrei Hagiu and Simon Rothman. 2016. Network eects arent enough. Harvard
business review 94, 4 (2016), 64–71.
[17] Andrew Hard, Kanishka Rao, Rajiv Mathews, Swaroop Ramaswamy, Franc¸oise
Beaufays, Sean Augenstein, Hubert Eichner, Chloe´ Kiddon, and Daniel Ram-
age. 2018. Federated learning for mobile keyboard prediction. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1811.03604 (2018).
[18] AI Hleg. 2019. Ethics guidelines for trustworthy AI. B-1049 Brussels (2019).
[19] Kevin Hsieh, Amar Phanishayee, Onur Mutlu, and Phillip B. Gibbons. 2019.
e Non-IID Data agmire of Decentralized Machine Learning. CoRR
abs/1910.00189 (2019). arXiv:1910.00189 hp://arxiv.org/abs/1910.00189
[20] Wenqiang Jin, Mingyan Xiao, Ming Li, and Linke Guo. 2019. If you do not
care about it, sell it: Trading location privacy in mobile crowd sensing. In IEEE
INFOCOM 2019-IEEE Conference on Computer Communications. IEEE, 1045–1053.
[21] Jakub Konecˇny`, H Brendan McMahan, Felix X Yu, Peter Richta´rik,
Ananda eertha Suresh, and Dave Bacon. 2016. Federated learning: Strategies
for improving communication eciency. arXiv preprint arXiv:1610.05492 (2016).
[22] Abhishek Kumar, Tristan Braud, Sasu Tarkoma, and Pan Hui. 2020. Trustwor-
thy AI in the Age of Pervasive Computing and Big Data. In IEEE International
Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops (PerCom
Workshops). IEEE, Austin, United States.
[23] Marcel Landeweerd, Ton Spil, and Richard Klein. 2013. e success of Google
search, the failure of Google health and the future of Google plus. In International
Working Conference on Transfer and Diusion of IT. Springer, 221–239.
[24] Jacob Lehman and Mike Dolan. 2020. Strict Products Liability: One More ing
the Internet Is Disrupting. hps://www.law.com/thelegalintelligencer/2020/01/
22/strict-products-liability-one-more-thing-the-internet-is-disrupting/.
[25] Moritz Lehne, Julian Sass, Andrea Essenwanger, Josef Schepers, and Sylvia un.
2019. Why digital medicine depends on interoperability. NPJ Digital Medicine 2,
1 (2019), 1–5.
[26] Shengli Li, Yipeng Liu, and Subhajyoti Bandyopadhyay. 2010. Network eects in
online two-sided market platforms: A research note. Decision Support Systems
49, 2 (2010), 245–249.
[27] Jierui Lin, Min Du, and Jian Liu. 2019. Free-riders in Federated Learning: Aacks
and Defenses. arXiv preprint arXiv:1911.12560 (2019).
[28] Michael Luca. 2017. Designing online marketplaces: Trust and reputation mech-
anisms. Innovation Policy and the Economy 17, 1 (2017), 77–93.
[29] John Lucker. 2015. e Dangers of Monetizing Data. hps://deloie.wsj.com/
cio/2015/06/30/the-dangers-of-monetizing-data/.
[30] Orla Lynskey. 2019. Criminal justice proling and EU data protection law:
precarious protection from predictive policing. International Journal of Law in
Context 15, 2 (2019), 162176. hps://doi.org/10.1017/S1744552319000090
[31] Benedict Mayaki. 2020. Vatican Workshop on Ethics and
AI. hps://www.vaticannews.va/en/vatican-city/news/2020-02/
vatican-airticial-intelligence-ethics-workshop.html.
[32] Evan S Medeiros. 2019. e Changing Fundamentals of US-China Relations. e
Washington arterly 42, 3 (2019), 93–119.
[33] Vida Ahmadi Mehri, Dragos Ilie, and Kurt Tutschku. 2018. Privacy and DRM
Requirements for Collaborative Development of AI Applications. In Proceedings
of the 13th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security. 1–8.
[34] Hitoshi Mitomo et al. 2017. Data Network Eects: Implications for Data Business.
In 28th European Regional ITS Conference, Passau 2017. International Telecommu-
nications Society (ITS).
[35] Milad Nasr, Reza Shokri, and Amir Houmansadr. 2019. Comprehensive privacy
analysis of deep learning: Passive and active white-box inference aacks against
centralized and federated learning. In 2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy (SP). IEEE, 739–753.
[36] Helen Nissenbaum. 2004. Privacy as contextual integrity. Wash. L. Rev. 79 (2004),
119.
[37] Eirini Ntoutsi, Pavlos Fafalios, Ujwal Gadiraju, Vasileios Iosidis, Wolfgang Nejdl,
Maria-Esther Vidal, Salvatore Ruggieri, Franco Turini, Symeon Papadopoulos,
Emmanouil Krasanakis, et al. 2020. Bias in Data-driven AI Systems–An Intro-
ductory Survey. arXiv preprint arXiv:2001.09762 (2020).
[38] Reuters. 2020. U.S. government limits exports of articial intelligence
soware. hps://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-articial-intelligence/
us-government-limits-exports-of-articial-intelligence-soware-idUSKBN1Z21PT.
[39] David Shepardson. 2020. White House proposes regulatory principles to
govern AI use. hps://www.reuters.com/article/us-tech-ces-ai-white-house/
white-house-proposes-regulatory-principles-to-govern-ai-use-idUSKBN1Z60GL.
[40] Reza Shokri, Marco Stronati, Congzheng Song, and Vitaly Shmatikov. 2017.
Membership inference aacks against machine learning models. In 2017 IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). IEEE, 3–18.
[41] Jiayu Shu, Rui Zheng, and Pan Hui. 2018. Cardea: Context-Aware Visual Privacy
Protection for Photo Taking and Sharing. In Proceedings of the 9th ACM Multi-
media Systems Conference (MMSys 18). Association for Computing Machinery,
New York, NY, USA, 304315. hps://doi.org/10.1145/3204949.3204973
[42] Jatinder Singh, Christopher Millard, Chris Reed, Jennifer Cobbe, and Jon
Crowcro. 2018. Accountability in the IoT: Systems, law, and ways forward.
Computer 51, 7 (2018), 54–65.
[43] Teradata. 2017. State of Articial Intelligence for Enter-
prises. Technical Report. www.multivu.com/players/English/
8075951-teradata-state-of-articial-intelligence-ai-for-enterprises.
[44] Meropi Tzanetakis, Gerrit Kamphausen, Bernd Werse, and Roger von Laufenberg.
2016. e transparency paradox. Building trust, resolving disputes and optimising
logistics on conventional and online drugs markets. International Journal of
Drug Policy 35 (2016), 58–68.
[45] U.S. Food and Drug Administration. 2020. Proposed Regulatory Framework for
Modications to Articial Intelligence/Machine Learning (AI/ML)-Based Soware
as a Medical Device (SaMD) - Discussion Paper and Request for Feedback. Technical
Report. U.S. Food and Drug Administration.
[46] Michael Veale, Reuben Binns, and Lilian Edwards. 2018. Algorithms that remem-
ber: model inversion aacks and data protection law. Philosophical Transactions
of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences 376, 2133
(2018), 20180083.
[47] William Vickrey. 1961. Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed
tenders. e Journal of nance 16, 1 (1961), 8–37.
[48] Nir Vulkan. 2003. e economics of e-commerce: a strategic guide to understanding
and designing the online marketplace. Princeton University Press.
[49] Nicholas Wallace. 2020. Europe plans to strictly regulate high-
risk AI technology. hps://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/02/
europe-plans-strictly-regulate-high-risk-ai-technology.
[50] Jindong Wang, Yiqiang Chen, Wenjie Feng, Han Yu, Meiyu Huang, and Qiang
Yang. 2020. Transfer Learning with Dynamic Distribution Adaptation. ACM
Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology (TIST) 11, 1 (2020), 1–25.
[51] WebFX. 2020. AI Pricing: How Much Does Articial Intelligence Cost? hps:
//www.webfx.com/internet-marketing/ai-pricing.html.
[52] Hema Yoganarasimhan. 2013. e value of reputation in an online freelance
marketplace. Marketing Science 32, 6 (2013), 860–891.
[53] Feng Zhu and Marco Iansiti. 2019. Why some platforms thrive and others don’t.
Harvard Business Review (2019).
[54] Michael Zimmer. 2018. Addressing Conceptual Gaps in Big Data Research Ethics:
An Application of Contextual Integrity. Social Media + Society 4, 2 (2018).
8
